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DEFINING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: SCHOLARLY 
DEBATE AND UN PRECISION
The article trace he origins and development o f the notion of transitional justice in 
scholarly publications and UN practice. It reveals the historical preconditions o f its 
development. It is being demonstrated that the notion o f transitional justice was originally 
associated with political transit, however later it has been used as a name for the series of 
measures designed to overcome the consequences of armed conflicts and other situations 
of mass violence. The article demonstrates the dual nature o f transitional justice.
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Плотников О. Визначення транзитивної юстиції: наукові дебати та 
практика ООН. — Стаття.
В статті розглядається виникнення та розвиток поняття транзитивної 
юстиції в науковій думці та практиці ООН. Простежуються історичні передумови 
зародження цього поняття, виявляються джерела його виникнення та розвитку. 
Доводиться, що поняття «транзитивна юстиція» початково асоціювалося з 
правовим забезпеченням політичного транзиту, однак пізніше воно почало 
використовуватися для позначення комплексу заходів, спрямованих на подолання 
наслідків збройних конфліктів та інших ситуацій масового насильства. 
Демонструється дуалізм концепції транзитивної юстиції.
Ключові слова: транзитивна юстиція, постконфліктне врегулювання, 
правосуддя перехідного періоду, політичний транзит, права людини.
Плотников О. Определение транзитивной юстиции: научные дебаты и 
практика ООН. — Статья.
В статье рассматривается возникновение и развитие понятия транзитивной 
юстиции в научной мысли и практике ООН. Прослеживаются исторические 
предпосылки зарождения этого понятия, выявляются источники его возникновения 
и развития. Доказывается, что понятие «транзитивная юстиция» изначально 
ассоциировалось с правовым обеспечением политического транзита, однако позже 
оно стало использоваться для обозначения комплекса мер, направленных на 
преодоление последствий вооруженных конфликтов и других ситуаций массового 
насилия. Демонстрируется дуализм концепции транзитивной юстиции.
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Ключевые слова: транзитивная юстиция, постконфликтное урегулирование, 
правосудие переходного периода, политический транзит, права человека.
Van Zyl and Freeman in 2002 compared transitional justice to 
biotechnology, that is “undergoing such rapid change that new 
developments often precede careful considerations of their impacts and 
implications” [26, p. 3]. This was ten years after the term “transitional 
justice” became a part of the scholarly discussion. Now, after 
transitional justice has celebrated its 25th birthday, it remains the same 
rapidly growing child of the changing international system, which is 
itself characterized by transition. The evolution of transitional justice 
has not slowed down since 2002 and virtually every case of its 
application brings new developments.
The term “transitional justice” first appeared in the legal 
discourse in th late 80s or early 90s of the XX century. However, just as 
with many other phenomena, the introduction of the term finalized a 
long-lasting evolution and signified its rise to a new level. The scholars 
are seemingly unanimous in the opinion, that the methods, techniques, 
and processes, that were later named “transitional justice”, existed 
decades if not centuries before. The difference is only in the moment 
that is defined as the birth of transitional justice.
Elster offered, perhaps, the most extravagant view. He suggests 
that elements of transitional justice can be found even in ancient 
history, giving an example of changes of the form of government in 
Ancient Athens from democracy to oligarchy and f rom oligarchy to 
democracy followed by property retributions. He proceeds with 
examples f rom the history of French restorations in 1814 and 1815 and 
adds cases f rom the XX century [7].
Teitel proposed a less radical approach, pointing at the origins of 
transitional justice after the World War I. According to her theory, the 
development of transitional justice can be divided into three phases. 
The first or “internationalism”, or “postwar” phase began as an attempt 
to restore peace after WWI, including through prosecutions of certain 
leaders of Germany and continued with the more successful cases of 
the Nurnberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as with the multi-year 
efforts of the WWII aggressor states to cure the committed wrongs both
52
on the domestic and international level. The second phase was 
associated with a series of democratic transitions, which started in 
many parts of the world in the late 80s, most notably in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. The third phase, which started around 2000 was 
characterized by a discourse on justice as means to overcome the 
consequences of conflicts and situations of violence [17].
Finally, Paige summarized the most common view, according to 
which the field of transitional justice began to emerge in the late 80s as 
a consequence of democratic transitions in the Latin American 
countries. It is here where the approach towards the country’s grimy 
past changed from judging and shaming (common for post-WWII 
trials) to attempts to bring the particular perpetrators to justice and 
achieve social reconciliation [14].
Undoubtedly, Elster’s and Teitel’s views reflect interesting 
historical experiences, which probably contributed to our understanding 
of justice, and which developed some tools, that later became a part of 
the transitional justice instrumentarium. However, transitional justice as 
a single legal theory did not exist and could not appear before the late 
1980s. Its development goes hand in hand with the with the theories of 
the democratic, or, in a broader understanding, political transit. As 
O ’Donnell and Schmitter ironically observed, these theories described 
“transition from certain authoritarian regimes towards an uncertain 
“something else” [13, p. 3]. Indeed, transitions from right-wing or left­
wing authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 
70s and 80s were not always smooth and did not always lead to the 
establishment of showcase democratic regimes [6, p. 3]. Already then it 
was clear that “transitions often fail” as “many countries succumb to 
the powerful forces that hinder democratic transition” [16, p. 9]. 
Already then it was apparent that the overthrow of a dictator by a 
parliament, the military, or an angry mob does not itself guarantee 
democratization. Democratic regimes did not grow immediately on the 
graves of the dictators, and required a long and complicated effort of 
the state and society. This effort became known under the name 
“democratic transition”.
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The academic discussion on the recent experiences of democratic 
transitions in the late 80s has been institutionalized in a series of 
conferences that brought together activists and experts from the 
affected regions, as well as interested scholars from the democratic 
states. Probably the first among those remarkable conferences, which 
laid the foundations of the future global transitional justice network, 
was a meeting arranged by the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute 
in November 1988. This Conference called “State Crimes: Punishment 
or Pardon” [see generally: 2] “aimed to sort out through moral, 
political, and legal implications of recent trials, commissions of injury, 
purges and other measures intended to hold previous regimes to 
account for systematic human rights abuses, as well as to foster a 
transition to democracy” [14, p. 322].
In this regard Henkin, one of the Conference organizers, later 
observed that “at that time there appeared to be only two ways in which 
the successor regime might deal with human rights violators who had 
remained members of the community...arrest, prosecute and punish or 
amnesty and amnesia” [8, p. 1]. These methods relied on the post- 
WWII experiences, however, the cases of Latin American transition 
demonstrated their insufficiency, since “the desire of truth is often more 
urgently felt by the v ic tim s.than  the desire of justice” [2, p. 93]. The 
1988 Conference concluded that a new paradigm of post-violence 
justice was necessary, where the establishment of truth would be more 
important, than prosecution, and the reparation to the victims would be 
more important than punishment of the perpetrators. Justice was no 
longer seen as a punishing sword for the villains, but a helping hand for 
those who suffered from violations and the society as a whole.
The next major development came with the Conference in 
Salzburg (Austria), which established the “Justice in Times of 
Transition” Project. On 7-10 March 1992 politicians, experts and 
activists from Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe, Post-Soviet 
countries and the USA met to discuss the ongoing democratic 
transitions. Probably, it was here where the term “transitional justice” 
has been articulated for the first time. At least, it is on several occasions
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mentioned in a journalist report prepared as a result of the Conference 
[1].
Ruti Teitel, who participated in the Salzburg Conference, claims 
personal authorship: “‘Transitional justice’ is an expression I coined in 
1991 at the time of the Soviet collapse and on the heels of the late 
1980’s Latin American transitions to democracy. In proposing this 
terminology, my aim was to account for the self-conscious construction 
of a distinctive conception of justice associated with periods of radical 
political change following past oppressive rule” [18, p. 1]. In the 
absence of the other pretenders, Teitel’s authorship seems to be 
undisputed. Most probably, the new term has been used in the 
correspondence between the organizers preceding the Salzburg 
Conference, including Teitel herself, Tim Pillips, Wendy Luers and 
Herman Schwartz [14, p. 229].
Yet, what is equally important, the term “transitional justice” was 
used sporadically alongside with similar terms. Finally, the term 
“justice in times of transition” has been chosen as the name of the 
Conference and the Project established as a result of the Conference. 
Probably, this solution looked sound at that time to separate the legal 
matters from the process of political transition and to avoid the question 
of whether transitional justice is a special kind of justice, and whether it 
is distinct from the human rights movement (these questions shall be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters).
Teitel’s term could remain an unsuccessful attempt to invent a 
name for a newborn phenomenon, but in 1995 it was picked up by a 
group of authors led by Kritz in their three-volume “Transitional 
justice: how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes” -  the 
first fundamental research in the field. This quite jumble collection of 
essays was nevertheless united by the common understanding of 
transitional justice as accompanying the process of democratization 
although is not equal to it [21, P. XVI]. The treatise lacked generalized 
theoretical understanding of the notion, characteristics and purposes of 
transitional justice. Rather it was a series of reflections from different 
countries, cultures and backgrounds, which painted a big picture of the 
existing factual situation and a set of narratives for further consideration
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and theorizing (this approach remains popular until today. See, for 
example [22]).
The absence of theoretical comprehension of the emerging field 
of transitional justice affected its subsequent development. Kritz 
himself claims that between 1990 and 2000 there were more than a 
1000 of scholarly publications worldwide in some manner addressing 
the issues of transitional justice (not including references in the popular 
press) [11, p. 22]. In contrast, according to Paige’s calculations, by 
2000 there were only 17 references to the term “transitional justice” in 
the scientific journals. In the absence of the theoretical basis for the 
new field, authors continued to research particular aspects o f the 
problem (like treatment of the fallen regime officials, truth 
commissions, compensations to victims of abuses), but each of these 
works was just a piece of a puzzle, which the authors did not know 
exist.
Another important feature of the studies in this period was that 
the authors seemed to agree that transitional justice had only a very 
limited international legal dimension (if any at all). The 1988 Aspen 
Conference considered that issues of transitional justice remain within 
the discretion of states. Although there exists a general international 
obligation to respect human rights, there is no obligation to take any 
exact measures, including those associated with the notion of 
transitional justice [2, p. 4]. In a similar vein, the participants of the 
1992 Salzburg Conference agreed with Orentlicher’s position, that the 
states are obliged under international law to comply with their 
obligation to protect human rights, including through prosecution of 
offenders. Yet, international law does not impose any strict obligations 
in this respect. Rather Orentlicher spoke of the “pressure of 
international law”, that “can make the difference in getting countries to 
prosecute” [1, p. 9]. Yet, the dramatic developments in the late 90s 
greatly expanded the role of international law and reshaped the notion 
of transitional justice itself.
In the mid-90s the World witnessed that what seemed to be 
forever blamed and forsaken: the genocide in Rwanda and a bloody 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, accompanied by war crimes, ethnic
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cleansings, concentration camps and other atrocities. Less famous, but 
not less horrific, were the atrocities committed during short and small- 
scale armed conflicts following the collapse of the USSR. Conflicts in 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Upper Karabakh, gathered their death toll 
amounting to tens of thousands.
All of those conflicts resulted from power change which was 
intended to democratize the ruling regimes. In Rwanda, the Genocide 
broke out after the peace accords which were to establish a government 
of national reconciliation. In Yugoslavia and the Post-Soviet States, 
mass atrocities took place in the course of armed conflicts between the 
parts of the former socialist federations, one brought together by force. 
Absence or tardiness of the international response casted discredit on 
the UN system, which failed to prevent the conflicts and accompanying 
atrocities. In the field of transitional justice, these cases demonstrated 
the need for greater international attention to cases of transition.
The Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were important for the 
accountability of the perpetrators. They also demonstrated that state 
sovereignty and immunities do not protect those responsible for 
international crimes. Yet these tribunals were an occasional reaction to 
the gravest atrocities that could not be left without international 
response. They were an instrument of investigation of punishment, in 
other words, retributive justice. Yet it was doubtful whether they could 
become an instrument of long-lasting peace and reconciliation. This 
was one of the reasons why the UN abandoned the international 
criminal tribunals model in favor of mixed tribunals and non-judicial 
means.
The experiences of Rwanda and Yugoslavia predetermined two 
remarkable shifts in the development of transitional justice. Firstly, it 
became a matter of international concern on the UN level. Secondly, it 
was no longer a model of justice for the period of transition to 
democracy. Rather it was a response to all forms of human rights 
violations, aimed at restoration of these rights and the rule of law. These 
shifts were accompanied by the further institutionalization of 
transitional justice both with NGO’s and international organizations.
LEX PO RTU S № 1(3)’2017 57
Questions associated with transitional justice have been 
occasionally discussed by the UN bodies since the early 90s (for 
example, [3], [4]). In 2003 the Security Council first mentioned the 
term in the framework of its longstanding work on the international rule 
of law. At the 4833 Session, which took place on the 24 of September 
2003, the Council has set the Justice and the Rule of Law as an item of 
its agenda. Jack Straw, who was at the time, The President of the 
Council as a representative of the United Kingdom, has set the direction 
of the discussion noting that the UN has long wrestled “with the 
challenges of bringing countries out of conflict and into societies based 
on justice and the rule of law” [10]. Further, the Secretary-General 
addressed the Council. Referring to the experience of the Task Force on 
the Rule of Law in Peace Operations, he noticed that “people lose faith 
in a peace process when they do not feel safe from crime, or secure in 
returning to their homes, or able to start rebuilding the elements of 
normal life, or confident that the injustices of the past will be 
addressed.. .we have seen that the rule of law is too fragile seldom lead 
to lasting democratic governance” [10]. He further observed that 
“transitional justice mechanisms need to concentrate on only on 
individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also on the need to 
achieve national reconciliation” [10]. The national representatives 
agreed on the importance of the rule of law in international relations, 
although their reports looked somehow like routine confirmations of 
the importance of the topic for international relations and for 
maintenance of peace.
What makes this meeting illustrative is that it was arguably the 
first international forum where transitional justice has been mentioned 
in relation to internal and international conflicts prevention. The 
President and the Secretary-General seemingly based their speeches on 
the previous scholarly works, thus making reference to the concept of 
democratic governance or national reconciliation. On the other hand, 
they attempted to tie the topic of the rule of law to the tasks of the 
Security Council, and therefore they could not avoid mentioning the 
current work of the United Nations on the maintenance of peace and 
security.
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Interestingly, the focus of the academic debate at that time also 
gradually shifted from the discussion of democratic transitions to the 
resolution of conflicts. Kritz illustrated the need for transitional justice 
with the example of the Former Yugoslavia, where failure to address the 
legacy of the ethnic conflict resulted in its repetition [11, p. 20]. On the 
other hand, many scholars continued to view transitional justice in its 
traditional “justice in times of transition” aspect. Elster in 2004 limited 
the scope of transitional justice to the “transition from one political 
regime to another” [7, p. I]. Teitel continued to associate transitional 
justice “with the periods of political change as reflected in the 
phenomenology of primarily legal responses that deal with the 
wrongdoing predecessor regimes” [19, p. 893], analyzing even post­
war transitions as types of a political transition [20]. In this fashion, in 
the early 2000 transitional justice became a partially fragmented 
concept discussing post-regime change transitions and post-conflict 
change transitions.
These processes were sometimes combined as the regime change 
is often accompanied by internal or even international armed conflict or 
other situations of mass violence. However, these situations do not 
necessarily follow or predetermine each other. Moreover, recent 
practice demonstrated that mechanisms associated with the field of 
transitional justice can be utilized even in the absence of both regime 
change and mass atrocities, but merely as an instrument to cure 
systematic human rights violations of the past (For example, in Canada 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been established in 
response to lawsuits over the damages inflicted by the Indian residential 
school system [12]. This fragmentation makes it considerably harder to 
offer a legal definition of international justice and, possibly even 
questions the need for such definition.
In this cacophony of differentiating views, the UN continued its 
attempts to bring the field of transitional justice to a common standard. 
In 2004 the Secretary-General in his famous report defined transitional 
justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
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reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none 
at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’ 
[21]. This definition clearly followed the “post- conflict” approach. The 
report uses terms like “war-torn societies” or post-conflict societies”. 
This possibly reflects the UN role as a guarantor of peace, as well as the 
principle of sovereignty, which prohibits, inter alia, the UN 
intervention into domestic regime change. One the other hand, the 
Secretary-General clearly took the reformist approach into account, as 
it describes the restoration of the rule of law and reform as the key 
instrument to achieve post-conflict reconciliation. The idea of the 
Report revolves around assisting the domestic institutions and capacity 
building.
Remarkably, in 2005 the Human Rights Council expanded the 
idea of the Report of the Secretary-General. In its report on human 
rights and transitional justice the Council underlined the importance of 
efforts “to restore justice and the rule of law in conflict and post­
conflict situations and, where relevant, in the context transitional 
process” [9]. This remark may demonstrate that the UN understanding 
expanded to include political transition, or, more probably, that the 
Human Rights Council was able to say that what has been omitted by 
the Secretary-General as a political leader and that situations of 
transition were from the very beginning in the focus of attention of the 
UN experts.
In the 2006 Report “Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United 
Nations support for the rule of law” the Secretary-General grouped the 
UN activities into “baskets”, where transitional justice was placed in 
the second basket: rule of law in the context of conflict and post­
conflict situations. He slightly altered the content of the notion 
compared to 2004 Report describing transitional justice as “national 
transitional justice consultation processes, truth and reconciliation 
processes, reparations, international and hybrid tribunals, national 
human rights institutions, vetting processes and ad hoc investigations, 
fact-finding and commissions of inquiry” [25]. In fact, the definition
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offered a list of institutions, actions and mechanisms in which the UN 
could assist the domestic transitional justice effort. Yet it remained 
pretty indefinite for a legal document.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, appointed in 2011 by the 
Human Rights Council, in his first report noticed that the term 
“transitional justice” does not refer to a special kind of justice, but “to a 
strategy for the realization of the rights to justice, truth, reparations and 
guarantees of non-recurrence in the aftermath of gross violations of 
human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law” 
[15]. However, in the same report, the Rapporteur clearly refers to the 
“practices and experiences in post-authoritarian settings, such as the 
Latin American countries of the Southern Cone and, to lesser extent, 
those in Central and Eastern Europe and South A frica” Further, the 
Rapporteur gave the account of the “progressive transfer” from post­
authoritarian settings to post-conflict context, where overcoming the 
consequences of the violations becomes more important than the 
reformation of the institutions.
Considering the personality and experience of the Special 
Rapporteur, it would be surprising if he was unaware of the post­
authoritarian aspect of transitional justice. Pablo de Greiff, who 
continuously occupies the position since 2011, is a Columbian lawyer, 
who personally participated in the processes of democratic transition in 
his country, and later headed the International Center for Transitional 
Justice in New York. That person is clearly more than familiar with the 
legal aspects of political transition. Nevertheless, the abovementioned 
report and the subsequent reports demonstrate the prevalence of the 
post-conflict approach.
In his personal capacity, de Greiff prefers that what he calls 
“holistic approach” to transitional justice, however, only to conclude 
that “strictly speaking, there is no such thing as “transitional justice” 
but only conceptions of what justice means when applied in transitional 
situations” [5]. For him, transitional justice seems to remain an abstract 
idea, that can have some applicability in practical situations, but is 
always too idealistic and never successful enough.
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This may be true at the highest levels of abstraction. Normative 
definitions given within the UN system are thus doomed to be 
inaccurate, as they attempt to reduce the variety of real-life situations to 
one strict formula. It can be assumed, that since an international legal 
definition of transitional justice cannot encompass the entire field, it 
should be limited by instrumental capabilities of the UN. In other 
words, it must describe what the UN can consider to be transitional 
justice for the purposes of further action.
If this stands true, no wonder that the UN experts have chosen the 
conflict-based approach to defining transitional justice. It relies on the 
more or less developed legal terms of conflict and human rights 
violations. In contrast, the regime change and social transition are not 
legal terms at all. Combined with the need for respect of state 
sovereignty, this makes it impossible to include them into the UN 
definition.
On the one hand, this resolves the definition problem, at least 
partially. An imperfect definition is better than no definition at all, and 
its availability makes further work possible. The conflict-based 
approach seems to be more comprehensive than the reformist approach, 
since virtually every political transition is accompanied by some sort of 
conflict and violence, while not every violence is a result of a reform. It 
also allows paying greater attention to the needs of the victims seeking 
justice. The definition can be amended as more information is collected 
on the ground and greater theoretical understanding is achieved.
On the other hand, the definition of transitional justice by such 
reputable bodies as the UN Human Rights Council and the Secretary 
General is likely to misleadingly limit further research. For instance, 
already now the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in an article on 
transitional justice concentrates heavily on overcoming conflicts and 
virtually ignores political transitions [23]. It should therefore be 
determined whether the early UN definitions will be guiding for further 
understanding of transitional justice (which in that case would shift 
from its original meaning), or these definitions reflect only the practical 
UN capabilities in regulating the field, which is itself much broader and 
covers all the legal and political aspects of transitions. In fact, the
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question is whether transitional justice will become a legal notion, or 
will remain a vague politico-socio-philosophic concept.
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